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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Colvin contends that, properly applying the rule as set forth in several Idaho
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals decisions, the district court erred when it denied
his motion to dismiss the felony domestic battery charge in this case under I.C. § 19-
3506 because prior to filing that charge, a misdemeanor charge of domestic battery
based on the same acts had been dismissed at the prosecutor’s motion.
The State responds that the new prosecution should not be barred by the statute,
but in making that argument, it focuses narrowly on the facts from a 1930 Idaho
Supreme Court decision to the exclusion of subsequent decisions which explain and
clarify how the relevant rule operates.  The more recent opinions are directly contrary to
the State’s position.  They make it clear that, by its plain language, I.C. § 19-3506 bars
filing of a new charge after a misdemeanor charge is dismissed, so long as the new
charge is for the same offense as the dismissed charge.  Furthermore, they make it
clear that whether a new charge alleges the same offense as the dismissed charge is
determined by applying the comparable analysis from the double jeopardy context.  As
such, the State’s arguments to the contrary should be rejected.
Since the district court’s decision to deny Mr. Colvin’s motion to dismiss the
felony charge in this case is contrary to the plain language of the statute, as well as
various Idaho appellate court decisions, this Court should reverse that order.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Colvin’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
3
ISSUE
Whether, because Idaho case law is clear that when a misdemeanor charge is
dismissed I.C. § 19-3506 bars any new prosecution for the same offense, the district
court erred when it denied Mr. Colvin’s motion to dismiss.
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ARGUMENT
Because Idaho Case Law Is Clear That When A Misdemeanor Charge Is Dismissed
I.C. § 19-3506 Bars Any New Prosecution For The Same Offense, The District Court
Erred When It Denied Mr. Colvin’s Motion To Dismiss
The State’s primary argument in this case is that State v. McKeehan, 49 Idaho
531, ___, 289 P. 993, 994 (1930), should dictate the resolution of this case.
Specifically, it contends that, since, in McKeehan, I.C. § 19-3506 did not prevent the
prosecutor from filing a higher charge and then dismissing a lesser charge, a dismissal
of a misdemeanor and subsequent filing of a felony charge should also be permitted
under I.C. § 19-3506 regardless of whether the felony charges the same acts as the
misdemeanor.  (See Resp. Br., pp.5-13.)  While McKeehan is relevant to the analysis of
the issue in this case, the State’s focus on that case to the exclusion of subsequent
decisions on that subject renders its argument unpersuasive.  In the ninety years since
McKeehan was decided, the Idaho Supreme Court and Idaho Court of Appeals have
both explained and clarified how the relevant rule operates.  In so doing, they have
revealed that the unambiguous language of the statute contradicts the State’s
argument.
For example, in State v. Barter, 80 Idaho 552 (1959), the Idaho Supreme Court
explained that to determine whether that rule used in McKeehan applies in other
situations, the courts need to determine “whether the two complaints charge the same
offense.” Barter, 80 Idaho at 556.  As in McKeehan, the two charging documents in
Barter alleged misdemeanors and were based on the same operative facts, but with a
variation as to one of the elements charged.  In McKeehan, the difference was between
possession and sale of the same intoxicating liquor. McKeehan, 289 P. at 994.  In
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Barter, the difference related to where the alleged act occurred:  the dismissed charge,
filed in the county court, alleged the act occurred in and beyond the city limits, whereas
the subsequent charge, filed in the city precinct court, alleged the act occurred only
within the city limits.  Id. at 554.  Per the State’s reading of McKeehan, the result in
Barter should have been denial of Barter’s motion to dismiss the second prosecution
under I.C. § 19-3506, as the decision to dismiss the county court charge in favor of
pursuing the city court charge would be the same as the prosecutor’s decision to pursue
the higher charge in McKeehan.   (See Resp. Br., pp.5-8.)  And yet, contrary to the
answer the State’s analysis yields, the Barter Court reached the opposite conclusion,
holding the second prosecution in Barter was impermissible under the statute. Barter,
80 Idaho at 556-57.
As such, the Idaho Supreme Court must have identified another relevant
consideration in Barter, one which the State’s argument in this case has not accounted
for – the sequence of the dismissal and new filing:  “It is well established that, after a
misdemeanor charge has been dismissed, a defendant cannot be prosecuted under a
subsequent, new complaint charging an identical offense based on the same acts as
the earlier, dismissed charge.” State v. Swartz, 109 Idaho 1033, 1036 (Ct. App. 1985)
(emphasis added); see, e.g., Barter, 80 Idaho at 556 (“dismissal of the [prior action]
would be a bar to any other prosecution for the same offense.”) (emphasis added);
State v. Hogan, 132 Idaho 412, 415 n.2 (Ct. App. 1999) (“a dismissal of the
misdemeanor would be a bar to subsequent prosecution (refiling) of the underlying
offense . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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With Barter’s clarification of the relevant rule in hand, the harmonious reading of
McKeehan and Barter becomes obvious.  On the one hand, in McKeehan, where the
second charging document was filed before the first charging document was dismissed,
the continuing prosecution of the same offense on what practically amounts to an
amended charge1 was not barred by the statute. See McKeehan,  289 P. at  994.  On
the other hand, in Barter, where the second charging document was filed after the first
charging document was dismissed, the subsequent prosecution on a new charge for the
same offense was statutorily-barred.2 See Barter, 80 Idaho at 554, 556.  In Mr. Colvin’s
case, the second charging document was filed after the first charging document was
dismissed.  (Compare R., pp.6, 67)  Thus, with Barter’s explanation of how the rule
used in McKeehan operates, the subsequent prosecution in this case, initiated after the
dismissal of the prior charge, would be barred under I.C. § 19-3506 so long as the two
charges are for the same offense.
The State challenges that conclusion by pointing out that, unlike Barter, the
second charging document in this case alleges a felony offense, as opposed to a
second misdemeanor.  However, the fact that the subsequent charge is a felony does
not mean, as the State contends, I.C. § 19-3506 should not apply in Mr. Colvin’s case.
1 The State does not respond to Mr. Colvin’s argument about the fact that the
prosecutor admitted he could have moved to amend the charge, as allowed by statute,
rather than dismissing the first charge, then subsequently trying to file a new charge
potentially in contravention of I.C. § 19-3506.  (See App. Br., pp.10-11; see generally
Resp. Br.)
2 If  there is  any remaining extent  to which the rule from Barter is inconsistent with the
rule from McKeehan, it is Barter, as the more recent pronouncement from the Supreme
Court on the subject, which would be the controlling law binding on the lower courts.
See State v. Doe, 139 Idaho 344, 347 (Ct. App. 2003); cf. State v. Clinton, 155 Idaho
271, 272 n.1 (2013).
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In fact, the Idaho Court of Appeals has determined the plain language of the statute
provides exactly the opposite:  “Idaho Code § 19-3506, by its express terms, bars
subsequent prosecution only if the charge dismissed is a misdemeanor.  It does not
prevent the state from further prosecution of a defendant where as in this case, the
charge dismissed is a felony.” State v. Hinostroza, 114 Idaho 621, 623 (Ct. App. 1988);
see also Barter, 80 Idaho at 556 (focusing on the “dismissal of the [prior action]” as the
bar to any subsequent prosecution for the same offense).  Thus, under I.C. § 19-3506,
the focus is on the nature of the “charge dismissed,” not, as the State would prefer, the
charge subsequently filed.  Whether the new charge is a felony or misdemeanor is,
thus, irrelevant under the plain language of the statute.
The State attempts to avoid that conclusion by making the bare assertion that
this statement (in Hinostroza and others) is just dicta.  (Resp. Br., p.13.)  That assertion
is mistaken because that statement is a necessary part of the ultimate decision, since it
explains how the courts reached their conclusions.  Thus, in Hinostroza, for example,
the defendant argued that the dismissal of a felony DUI charge barred prosecution of a
subsequently-filed charge of vehicular manslaughter. Hinostroza, 114 Idaho at 622.
The Court of Appeals concluded that argument was flawed because I.C. § 19-3506
provides that:  “‘An order for the dismissal of the action, as provided in this chapter, is a
bar to any other prosecution of the same offense, if it is a misdemeanor; but it is not a
bar if the offense is a felony.’” Id. at 623, 623 n.1 (quoting I.C. § 19-3506) (emphasis
from Hinostroza).  It determined that the statutory language clearly directed its focus to
the nature of the dismissed charge, and so, it held I.C. § 19-3506 did not apply to
Hinostroza’s case because “[i]t does not prevent the state from further prosecuting a
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defendant where, as in this case, the charge dismissed is a felony.” Id. at 623.
Therefore, the State’s argument to the contrary – that this Court should base its
decision on the fact that the newly-filed charge is a felony – should be rejected because
that fails to follow the unambiguous language of the statute. See Verska v. Saint
Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr, 151 Idaho 889, 893 (2011) (“If the statute is not ambiguous,
this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written.”).  The dismissed
charge was a misdemeanor, and so, under the plain language of the statute, the
subsequently-filed charge should have been dismissed if it was for the same offense.
The State also contests this conclusion by suggesting that “[t]he Idaho Supreme
Court appeared to affirm that the McKeehan holding applies in misdemeanor-felony
cases” in State v. Randolph, 61 Idaho 456, ___, 102 P.2d 913, 914 (1940).  (Resp.
Br., p.8 n.3.) Randolph does nothing of the sort.  In fact, it was not even considering the
same issues since no charges were ever dismissed in that case. See generally
Randolph, 102 P.2d 913.  Rather, Randolph dealt with the “reluctant corpse” problem,
where the defendant initially pleads guilty to battery, and thereafter, the victim
succumbs to his injuries. See State v. Brusseau, 96 Idaho 558, 560-61 (1975).  The
issue in that case, then, was whether the new murder charges were prohibited by the
constitutional protections against double jeopardy in light of the prior battery conviction.
Randolph, 102 P.2d at 914-15.
The wrinkle in Randolph to which the State refers was the fact that, in appealing
the denial of his claim of former jeopardy against the new murder charge, the defendant
argued that the prosecutor should not have withdrawn his pre-guilty-plea motion to
dismiss the battery charge, as it was the defendant’s belief that dismissal of that charge
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was appropriate under McKeehan. See id.  The Idaho Supreme Court held that the
defendant could not raise that argument on appeal because he had actually contested
the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss below (i.e., it was invited error). Id.  Therefore,
Randolph offers no discussion on the merits of the defendant’s argument, and so, it did
not, apparently or otherwise, adopt the defendant’s argument, which means it did not,
apparently or otherwise, affirm the State’s reading of McKeehan.
And even if the Randolph Court had considered the merits of that argument, the
case law still shows the State’s contention – that, had the battery charge been
dismissed, I.C. § 19-3506 would not have barred the murder charge simply because
murder is a felony and the battery was a misdemeanor – is meritless.  Rather, death is
“a sufficient additional act” which makes murder a different offense than battery. See
Brusseau, 96 Idaho at 560; Randolph, 102 P.2d at 915.  Applying the rule used in
McKeehan to that fact pattern, rather than just comparing facts out of context as the
State does, I.C. § 19-3506 would not prohibit a subsequent murder prosecution
following dismissal of the misdemeanor battery charge because the murder charge
alleges a different offense based on a different act. See Barter, 80 Idaho at 556.
Therefore, the State’s reliance on Randolph is wholly misplaced.
Because the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss a misdemeanor charge in this case
was granted before he filed the new charge, the prosecution on the subsequent charge
would be barred under the plain language of I.C. § 19-3506 if the new charge is for the
same offense as the dismissed charge. Barter, 80 Idaho at 556; Hinostroza, 114 Idaho
at 623.  Thus, the only question remaining is whether the new charge of felony domestic
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battery is for the “same offense” as the previously-dismissed misdemeanor charge of
domestic battery. See Barter, 80 Idaho at 556.
The district court, applying an analysis form the double jeopardy context
(specifically, the federal statutory theory from Blockburger3), determined those two
allegations of domestic battery charged the same offense, as the misdemeanor charge
is a lesser included offense of the felony.  (R., pp.82-84.)  The conclusion is accurate.
State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 8 (2013) (“under the statutory theory, the misdemeanor
domestic battery charge is a lesser included offense of felony domestic battery . . . .”).
Therefore, they are the “same offense” for purposes of I.C. § 19-3506, since, as in
Barter, the only difference is one of extent of the act, not a difference in the act itself.4
See Barter, 80 Idaho at 556 (holding the charges were for the “same offense” even
though one alleged the act occurred outside city limits, while the other did not).
Nevertheless, the State challenges that conclusion based on its belief that Idaho’s
courts have not “definitively state[d] what ‘same offense’ means in [the I.C. § 19-3506]
context.”  (Resp. Br., pp.10-12.)  It does not explain why these two analyses should use
different standards, but instead, circles back to McKeehan and contends this Court
should conclude that, simply because it alleges a higher version of the offense, the new
charge should be read as alleging a different offense.  (See Resp. Br., pp.10-12.)  This
argument, like the State’s others in this case, is belied by the case law.
Specifically, the Court of Appeals did directly address this question in State v.
Barlow’s, Inc., where it held:  “Although immunity attaches more readily than does
3 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
4 The difference in this case is simply whether or not the act is alleged to have caused
“traumatic injury.” See I.C. § 18-918(2)-(3).
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double jeopardy protection, comparable tests of ‘offense identity’ are applicable.  Like
the double jeopardy clauses, I.C. § 19-3506 is intended to protect individuals against
repeated charges and trials for the same offense.” State v. Barlow’s, Inc., 111 Idaho
958, 960 (Ct. App. 1986) (emphasis added).  This use of the comparable double
jeopardy analysis traces back to the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Barter, where it
explained that I.C. § 19-3506 prevented the subsequent prosecution because, from a
double jeopardy perspective, “[a] conviction or acquittal of the offense charged in the
first complaint would be a bar to prosecution under the second complaint.  Likewise, the
offense charged in the second complaint is included in the dismissal of the offense
charged in the first complaint.” Barter, 80 Idaho at 556.  Therefore, the State’s belief
that this question has not been definitively addressed is mistaken.
Rather, it was only after directly concluding that the double jeopardy analysis was
the proper analysis that the Court of Appeals explored “the buffet” of potential lines of
analysis within the double jeopardy context.  (See Resp. Br., p.11 n.4.)  However, this
was not an examination of mutually exclusive approaches; rather, it was a discussion of
the fact that Idaho employs a different test to evaluate double jeopardy violations under
its own laws than the one used to assess double jeopardy violations under the federal
constitution:  Idaho has “enlarge[d] the scope of double jeopardy in that it prohibits
double punishment for the same act or omission and is not limited to the same
offense.”5 Barlow’s, Inc., 111 Idaho at 961.  Both tests remain valid means to assess
5 Although Barlow’s, Inc., was specifically focused on Idaho’s double jeopardy statute,
I.C. § 18-301, which has subsequently been repealed, the Barlow’s, Inc., analysis is still
valid since the enlarged protection against double jeopardy is also provided by the
Idaho Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Sepulveda, 161 Idaho 79, ___, 383 P.3d 1249,
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the “same offense” question though. See Sepulveda, 383 P.3d at 1257 n.4 (noting the
separate analysis via the federal test, had the argument in that case also been raised
under the federal Constitution); State v. Moad, 156 Idaho 654, 658 n.3 (Ct. App. 2014)
(indicating the confusion as to the continuing applicability of both tests has been
resolved).  Besides, the fact that the district court used the narrower of the two
approaches reveals that, whichever double jeopardy analysis should be used, the two
charges still allege the same offense in this case.  Ultimately, though, the Court of
Appeals’ discussion of the differing approaches within the double jeopardy analysis
does not change the fact that it definitively stated the double jeopardy analysis is the
appropriate analysis to use when evaluating whether two charges allege the same
offense under I.C. § 19-3506.
In fact, this analysis is apparent in the Court of Appeals’ resolution of the claims
in Barlow’s, Inc.  Specifically, Barlow’s, Inc., had initially been charged with violating two
city ordinances, first by installing electrical improvements which were not to code, and
second, by making an electrical installation without obtaining a permit from the city.
Barlow’s, Inc., 111 Idaho at 959.  After those initial charges were dismissed, new
charges alleging the same violations but as occurring on a different date were filed. Id.
at 959-60.  In regard to the failure-to-obtain-a-permit charge, the Court of Appeals held
that the charged conduct was a single act, and because of the previously-dismissed
charge in regard to that act, “the city was barred by I.C. § 19-3506 from renewing the
charge with respect to the same installation.” Id. at 961.  However, the Court of Appeals
1257 (2016) (applying the same analysis that had been used in regard to I.C. § 18-301
to a claim of double jeopardy raised solely under the Idaho Constitution).
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held the not-to-code charge was not barred because, as that was an ongoing offense,
each new day the problem went unresolved constituted a new act, and thus, a new
violation of the city ordinance. Id. at 962.  As such, “Barlow’s was not prosecuted for
the same act” under the new charge in that regard, but rather, it was being prosecuted
for the new act of failing to correct the initial, improper installation. Id. at 962.
As a result, the district court’s use of the federal double jeopardy standard to
conclude that the two complaints charged the same offense based on the same acts
was not inappropriate.  Since the felony domestic battery charge against Mr. Colvin
entirely encompasses the allegations of the previously-dismissed misdemeanor
domestic battery, both charges were based on the same acts, and therefore, alleged the
same offense for purposes of I.C. § 19-3506. Compare Barter, 80 Idaho 556.  As a
result, since the dismissed battery charge was also a misdemeanor, by the express
terms of I.C. § 19-3506, the prosecution on the subsequently-filed charge for that same
offense should have been barred.  Therefore, the district court’s order denying of
Mr. Colvin’s motion to dismiss the subsequently-filed charge was erroneous.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Colvin respectfully requests this Court reverse the order denying his motion
to dismiss the charges in this case.
DATED this 13th day of April, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
14
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 13th day of April, 2017, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be placed a
copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
THOMAS CRUZ COLVIN
685 DICKSON AVENUE





BANNOCK COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
E-MAILED BRIEF
__________/s/_______________
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
BRD/eas
